

**International Association for the Philosophy of Time: 4<sup>th</sup> Annual Conference**

Gargnano del Garda, Italy

MONDAY 12<sup>TH</sup> JUNE, 2017

*Ground Floor, Aula Magna*

09.30–10.45

**Jennifer Hornsby**

*Time, Agency, and Our Understanding of 'Events'*

Chair: Giuliano Torrenco

10.45–11.00

-- COFFEE BREAK --

Session 1

*Ground Floor, Aula Magna*

Session 2

*First Floor, Aula*

11.00–11.55

Christian Tarsney

'Thank goodness that's Newcomb'

Chair: Daria Vitasovic

Commentator: Jennifer Hornsby

Graeme Forbes

'Change you can believe in'

Chair: Samuele Iaquinto

Commentator: Giuliano Torrenco

12.00–12.55

Sayid Bnefsi

'Future bias and presentism'

Chair: Daria Vitasovic

Commentator: Jennifer Hornsby

Lisa Leininger

'Abandoning absolute becoming'

Chair: Samuele Iaquinto

Commentator: Giuliano Torrenco

13.00–14.30

-- LUNCH --

**Patrick Blackburn**

*Arthur Prior and Hybrid Logic*

14.30–15.45

Chair: Ulrich Meyer

Session 3

*Ground Floor, Aula Magna*

Session 4

*First Floor, Aula*

15.50–16.45

David Jakobsen & Peter Øhrstrøm  
‘In celebration of *Past, Present and Future*’

Chair: Valerio Buonomo

Commentator: Patrick Blackburn

Boo Jackson  
‘Haslangerian genders and temporal ontology’

Chair: Benjamin Neeser

Commentator: Jonathan Tallant

16.50–17.45

Giuseppe Spolaore & Fabio Del Prete  
‘Now there will be trouble:  
Two puzzles of tense-modal forcing’

Chair: Valerio Buonomo

Commentator: Patrick Blackburn

Natalja Deng  
‘In defense of veridicalism’

Chair: Benjamin Neeser

Commentator: Jonathan Tallant

17.45–18.00

-- COFFEE BREAK --

Session 5

*Ground Floor, Aula Magna*

Session 6

*First Floor, Aula*

18.00–18.55

Emiliano Boccardi & Federico Perelda  
‘No illusion of passage without real passage’

Chair: Giacomo Andreoletti

Commentator: David Braddon-Mitchell

Matteo Benocci  
‘Existential fragility and stage replacement within four-dimensionalism’

Chair: Samuele Iaquinto

Commentator: Claudio Calosi

19.00–19.55	<p>Alison Fernandes</p> <p>‘Freedom, self-prediction and the metaphysics of time travel’</p> <p>Chair: Giacomo Andreoletti</p> <p>Commentator: David Braddon-Mitchell</p>	<p>Marius Backmann</p> <p>‘No time for powers’</p> <p>Chair: Samuele Iaquinto</p> <p>Commentator: Claudio Calosi</p>
20.30–22.00	-- DINNER --	

	TUESDAY 13 <sup>TH</sup> JUNE, 2017	
09.30–10.45	<i>Ground Floor, Aula Magna</i>	
	<p><b>Sven Rosenkranz</b></p> <p><i>Dynamic Theories of Time – A Fresh Start</i></p> <p>Chair: Fabrice Correia</p>	
10.45–11.00	-- COFFEE BREAK --	
	Session 7 <i>Ground Floor, Aula Magna</i>	Session 8 <i>First Floor, Aula</i>
11.00–11.55	<p>Michael Nelson</p> <p>‘Times as different realities’</p> <p>Chair: Valerio Buonomo</p> <p>Commentator: Sven Rosenkranz</p>	<p>Olla Solomyak</p> <p>‘Presentism and the specious present: From temporal experience to meta-metaphysics’</p> <p>Chair: Paula Sweeney</p> <p>Commentator: Kristie Miller</p>

12.00–12.55	Ciro De Florio, Aldo Frigerio, & Alessandro Giordani ‘On the eternal dynamical universe’  Chair: Valerio Buonomo Commentator: Sven Rosenkranz	
13.00–14.30	-- LUNCH --	
14.30–15.45	<i>Ground Floor, Aula Magna</i>	
	<b>Jenann Ismael</b>  <i>Some Thoughts on Time, Totality, and Transcendence: Or, Why the Problem of Determinism is Really the Problem of Fatalism</i>  Chair: Kristie Miller	
	Session 9  <i>Ground Floor, Aula Magna</i>	Session 10  <i>First Floor, Aula</i>
15.50–16.45	Giovanni Merlo ‘A simple argument for passage’  Chair: Clotilde Calabi Commentator: Jenann Ismael	Cristian López ‘Unpacking the problem of the arrow of time in physics’  Chair: Cristian Mariani Commentator: Vincenzo Fano
16.50–17.45	Matt Farr ‘Explaining temporal qualia’  Chair: Clotilde Calabi Commentator: Jenann Ismael	Christian Wüthrich ‘Our world may be deterministic or indeterministic—or both’  Chair: Cristian Mariani Commentator: Vincenzo Fano
17.45–18.00	-- COFFEE BREAK --	

18.00–19.30	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Roundtable: Temporal Illusions</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">Valteri Arstila Adrian Bardon Sean Power</p>
20.00–22.00	-- GALA DINNER --

	WEDNESDAY 14 <sup>TH</sup> JUNE, 2017	
09.30–10.45	<p style="text-align: right;"><i>Ground Floor, Aula Magna</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>Tim Maudlin</b> <i>Temporal Structure in Evaporating Black Holes</i></p> <p>Chair: David Braddon-Mitchell</p>	
10.45–11.00	-- COFFEE BREAK --	
	Session 11 <i>Ground Floor, Aula Magna</i>	Session 12 <i>First Floor, Aula</i>
11.00–11.55	<p style="text-align: center;">Nina Emery ‘Presentism, actualism, and the relativity objection’</p> <p>Chair: Cristian Mariani Commentator: Tim Maudlin</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Hope Sample ‘Kant on the inner intuition of time and the perception of succession’</p> <p>Chair: Nick Young Commentator: Davide Bordini</p>

12.00–12.55	<p style="text-align: center;">Christian Loew</p> <p style="text-align: center;">‘Fundamentality and time’s arrow’</p> <p>Chair: Cristian Mariani</p> <p>Commentator: Tim Maudlin</p>	
13.00–14.30	-- LUNCH --	

### Abstracts for the Keynote Addresses:

Patrick Blackburn, ‘Arthur Prior and Hybrid Logic’

*Abstract.* It is well known that Arthur Prior was the creator of tense logic; it is less well known that he also founded what has become known as hybrid logic, and that this second creation raised difficult questions for his own views on time. Prior held an A-series of view of time, and his tense logic was meant to reflect - indeed, to constitute - this view. If as he himself showed, his hybrid logic was capable of something very much like B-series talk, and (as he also realised) this raised a difficult question anew: What was so special about tensed talk after all? In my presentation, I will outline some of the ideas that led Prior to this realisation. I will not presuppose any previous knowledge of tense or hybrid logic: Prior's ideas have a simplicity and elegance that make them straightforward to present. But these ideas also led him to a problematic place; I will take the audience there, and then indicate a way out.

Jennifer Hornsby, ‘Time, Agency, and Our Understanding of ‘Events’’

*Abstract.* Many discussions of time are replete with claims about events; and many philosophers of action take actions to be events. My focus will be on what can be right with, and how much is wrong with, the idea of events which philosophers have introduced into the language of agency. I criticize various accounts in order to promote a view about time different from that of Eternalism, Presentism and Growing Block-ism. I consider two objections to my stratagem. (1) General conclusions about time can't be drawn from thinking specifically about human action. (2) The idea of the present of which I make use is mismatched to how we, as agents ourselves, understand ‘present’. I'll attempt to defend my view against these objections.

Jenann Ismael, ‘Some Thoughts on Time, Totality, and Transcendence: Or, Why the Problem of Determinism is Really the Problem of Fatalism’

*Abstract.* Fatalism and determinism are usually treated separately. Both pose challenges to free will that seem to have received support from modern physics, but the challenges come from different parts of physics. One has to do with laws, and gets support from Newtonian Mechanics. The other has to do with time and gets support from the Relativist. The determinist worries that there are relations of necessitation built into the very fabric of reality that determine how it unfolds. The fatalist worries that the universe does not unfold at all; the future is simply there. I'm going to show how to connect them by linking determinism to totality and totality to the transcendent perspective on time adopted

relativity. The connection brings the central problem that has always framed the philosophical discussion of time more clearly into focus: viz., the problem how to reconcile transcendent and immanent visions of the universe (or the problem of how to reconcile the view of the universe from outside of space and time and the view from within). I will suggest that the right way to think of the transcendent and immanent visions is as compatible, but complementary.

Tim Maudlin, 'Passage in the Block'

*Abstract.* Over many years, different views about the nature and structure of space and time have acquired various names and associations. In one common usage, it is said that one sort of view accepts a "block universe" or is a "B-theory", and therefore rejects the notions of a "passage" or "flow" of time, while a "dynamical" or "A-theory" account of time accepts that time "flows" or "passes". Further, it is also often added that according to the "block universe" view there is no intrinsic direction of time, while according to a "dynamic theory" there is. Finally, it is often said that present physics (especially Relativity) endorses or entails a 'block universe' theory, so anyone desiring to maintain that time "passes" must modify present physics. I will argue that all of this is misconceived. There is no incompatibility between a "block universe" and "dynamical time" or "passage of time". Further, nothing in physics precludes, or even casts doubt on, an intrinsic direction of time. If one wants to speak of a block universe, there is passage in the block and directionality in the block. I will briefly discuss a way of characterizing the geometrical structure of space-time that can make this evident.

Sven Rosenkranz, 'Dynamic Theories of Time — A Fresh Start'

*Abstract.* In this talk, based on joint work with Correia, I will offer logically perspicuous and conceptually lean formulations of the characteristic tenets of three dynamic theories of time (presentism, the growing block theory, and dynamic permanentism aka the Moving Spotlight Theory), and on this basis show how, with sufficient care and attention to detail, some of the most notorious challenges to either type of view can successfully be averted or defused.