Daniel Dohrn

Senior Member

I am a researcher at the university of Milan. Before coming to Milan in 2019, I worked at the universities of Berlin, Mannheim, Aachen, Konstanz, and Munich. I am interested in questions of modality, combining issues from philosophy of language, modal epistemology, metaphysics, aesthetics, and history of philosophy from Descartes onwards. In particular, I have worked on imagination and counterfactual thinking in modal epistemology and on the epistemology of thought experiments. I am also interested in how time and modality interact. Among the topics I would like to address within the Centre for Philosophy of Time are the role of tense morphology in the semantics of conditionals and the role of the asymmetry between past and future in counterfactuals, probabilistic, and deliberational reasoning.

Recent Publications

Forthcoming a Counterfactuals and Non-Exceptionalism about Modal Knowledge, Erkenntnis. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-018-0086-5

Forthcoming b Modal Epistemology Made Concrete, Philosophical Studies. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1135-2

2018a Thought Experiments without Possible Worlds, Philosophical Studies 175, 363-384. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-017-0871-z

2018b Moral Sentimentalism in Counterfactual Contexts: Moral Properties are Response-Enabled. Philosophia 46, 69-82. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-017-9913-1

2018c La fantaisie, est-elle le privilege des seuls poètes? –Moritz Schlick on a ‘Sinnkriterium’ for Thought Experiments. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 18, 87-101

2017a Nobody Bodily Knows Possibility. The Journal of Philosophy 114, 678-686.

2017b Is There an Incremental Reading of Conditionals?. Australasian Philosophical Review 1, 173-178. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/24740500.2017.1346412?scroll=top&needAccess=true

2017c Presuppositional Anaphora Is the Sobel Truth, in: Domaneschi, P., Salvatore Reda, G. (ed.), Implicatures and Presuppositions, 199-238. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-50696-8_8

2016 Fiction and Thought Experiment. A Case Study. Teorema 35, 185-199.

2015 Egan and Agents. How Evidential Decision Theory Could Deal with Egan’s Dilemma. Synthese 192, 1883-1908. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0661-0

2011 Are there a Posteriori Conceptual Necessities?. Philosophical Studies 155, 181-197. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-010-9568-2

2010 Hume on Knowledge of Metaphysical Modalities. Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy 13, 38-59

2009 Counterfactual Narrative Explanation. The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 67, 37-47 


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