CPT/FraMEPhys Workshop on Time and Explanation
Monday 20 & Tuesday 21 August 2018
Università degli Studi di Milano, Aula 211
Via Festa del Perdono 7, Milan
As a warm-up event for SMS4 (4th Annual Conference of the Society for Metaphysics of Science) the Centre for Philosophy of Time in Milan and the FraMEPhys project at the University of Birmingham are co-hosting a workshop on Time and Explanation. All are welcome but please email email@example.com if you plan to attend.
Sam Baron (University of Western Australia)
Christina Conroy (Morehead State University)
Heather Demarest (University of Colorado, Boulder)
Alison Fernandes (University of Warwick/Trinity College Dublin)
Mike Hicks (University of Cologne)
Dave Ingram (University of York)
Alastair Wilson (University of Birmingham)
Monday 20 August
13.00 – 13.15: Alastair Wilson – “Intro”
13.15 – 14.45: David Ingram – “Nefarious Metaphysical Explanations”
14.45 – 15.00: Coffee break
15.00 – 16.30: Alison Fernandes – “Three Accounts of Laws and Time”
16.45 – 18.15: Michael Hicks – “Space-Time Symmetries and Inductive Discovery”
Tuesday 21 August
10.00 – 11.30: Sam Baron – “The Metaphysics of Spacetime Emergence”
11.30 – 11.45: Coffee break
11.45 – 13.15: Christina Conroy & Alastair Wilson – “Relationism and the Structure of Time”
13.15 – 15.00: Lunch
15.00 – 16.30: Heather Demarest – “Flowing Alone”
16.45 – 17.15: General discussion
Samuel Baron (University of Western Australia)
“The Metaphysics of Spacetime Emergence”
Recent developments in physics suggest that spacetime is not fundamental but arises from a fundamental reality that lacks spatial, temporal and spatiotemporal properties. I argue that standard metaphysical accounts of emergence won’t work for the emergence of spacetime and so a new metaphysics is needed.
Christina Conroy (Morehead State University) & Alastair Wilson (University of Birmingham and Monash University)
“Relationism and the Structure of Time”
We discuss the contingency (or lack thereof) of some widely-discussed views about the structure of time, and defend a necessitarian perspective according to which the structure of time (in particular, its topological structure) should be regarded as epistemically but not metaphysically contingent. This perspective opens up a new way of defending relationism about time.
Heather Demarest (University of Colorado, Boulder)
Standardly, presentist theories of time accept both a shared, universal present moment as well as flow. But, these two features are notoriously difficult to reconcile with special relativity, according to which there is no absolute, non-conventional simultaneity. I explore a view that I think is worthy of serious consideration. This view rejects a universal, shared present, but accepts temporal flow. I argue that this view can accommodate the time dilation of special relativity, and also, that it can recover the intuitive picture of ourselves as beings who change as time passes.
Alison Fernandes (Warwick University/Trinity College, Dublin)
“Three Accounts of Laws and Time”
Loewer distinguishes two approaches to the metaphysics of science: Humean accounts that deny primitive modality and explain temporal asymmetries in scientific terms, and anti-Humean accounts that take temporal asymmetry and modality as primitives. I’ll argue that Loewer neglects an important third approach: explain temporal asymmetries as well as the function of modal notions in scientific terms. This kind of pragmatist approach provides a clear ontology to fundamental science, and doesn’t replace scientific explanation with metaphysics.
Michael Hicks (University of Cologne)
“Space-Time Symmetries and Inductive Discovery”
Recently, a number of authors (Jaag and Loew, Dorst) have argued that pragmatic considerations motivate the idea that they laws of physics should be invariant under certain symmetry transformations. These arguments follow Wigner (1967) in noting that laws which are not invariant under, for example, the Poincare symmetry group will deliver behavior that varies in different experimental contexts. Since our only access to laws is through their application to a wide variety of isolated systems, the argument goes, we would be unable to inductively discover such laws. Some Humeans have gone further: they’ve argued that this constraint on inductive practice allows us to give a pragmatic explanation of this feature of laws. Here, I’ll argue that that this argument goes too far: laws could fail to be invariant under any of these symmetries and still be discoverable and applicable–provided their divergence from perfectly respecting these symmetries is not too great. So, rather than requiring laws to be strictly invariant under these symmetry transformations, we should require something weaker, for example, invariance in a low-energy limit. I conclude by arguing that, given that the induction requires less than full invariance under these transformations, the Humean pragmatic explanation of symmetry invariances does not go through.
David Ingram (University of York)
“Nefarious Metaphysical Explanations”
I extend and develop some recent ideas about ‘nefarious’ responses to the truth-maker problem facing presentism (see ‘Nefarious Presentism’, Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 65; ‘Truth and Dependence’, Ergo, vol. 5). I argue that the success of this project of ‘nefarious metaphysical explanation’ may prove decisive in the debate between presentism and non-presentism.
This event is supported by the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant agreement No 757295), together with the Department of Philosophy of the University of Milan.