05 December 2024– Ikuro Suzuki (Nihon University) – “Presentism and Persistence”
Aula “Martinetti”, Via Festa del Perdono 7, h. 14:00
Abstract. In recent publications, several authors have highlighted the difficulties presentism faces in accounting for persistence (e.g., Tallant 2018; Leininger, forthcoming). This talk identifies three general concerns that arise in explaining persistence within the framework of presentism. First, there is the compatibility concern: persistence seems to inherently presuppose the existence of multiple times, so presentism—which denies the existence of any time other than the present—appears incompatible with any account of persistence (as argued by Tallant 2018). Second, there is the explanatory concern: this reflects the worry that presentism may fail to provide an adequate account of persistence (as discussed by Leininger, forthcoming). Third, there is the substantiality concern: even if presentism can accommodate various accounts of persistence, the distinctions between these accounts may fail to be substantive. In this talk, I will examine possible presentist responses to these concerns, particularly the second and third ones. I will argue that, in its current state, presentism does not effectively address these challenges.